The 2025 Rules on Extradition Proceedings are inapplicable to ICC Warrants

by: Atty. Dino S. de Leon and Atty. Lance Vladimir M. Molino | 11 November 2025

On November 8, 2025, newly appointed Ombudsman Jesus Crispin Remulla mentioned a supposed International Criminal Court (“ICC”) warrant of arrest against Senator Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa in connection with the Duterte administration’s bloody war on drugs.[1] Although the ICC has yet to issue official confirmation, this development immediately raised questions at the intersection of international law and Philippine procedural rules, particularly the applicability of the 2025 Rules on Extradition Proceedings (“Rules on Extradition”)[2] to a warrant from the ICC.

Promulgated under A.M. No. 22-03-29-SC dated April 8, 2025, the Rules on Extradition aim to make extradition proceedings consistent, clear, and efficient, which include applications for warrants of arrest, hold departure orders, and bail.[3] The Rules on Extradition took effect on November 10, 2025.

The question now arises: may a request or warrant of arrest issued by the ICC be properly classified as “extradition” within the meaning of the new Rules on Extradition?

This editorial submits in the negative.

The ICC Warrant is Beyond the Scope of the Rules on Extradition.

The concept of an International Arrest Warrant issued by an International Tribunal where the Philippines was a State Party is a different concept from that of extradition. As such, the Rules on Extradition do not apply to an ICC warrant.

By their very terms, Rules on Extradition govern only extradition requests from a foreign state that has an extradition treaty with the Philippines. To state the obvious, the ICC is not a state: it is an international tribunal created by multilateral treaty and there exists no bilateral or multilateral extradition treaty between the Philippines and the ICC.

The Rules on Extradition define “Requesting State” as “the foreign state” seeking surrender of an accused,[4] and an “Extradition Treaty” as a treaty between the Philippines and a requesting State or a multilateral agreement to which both are State Parties containing extradition provisions.[5] 

The ICC fails both definitions. It is neither a foreign state nor a party to any extradition agreement with the Philippines.

In practical terms, this means an ICC arrest warrant cannot trigger the judicial extradition process.

Under the Rules on Extradition, extradition is a state-to-state legal process requiring a formal request from a foreign government and a governing treaty.[6] Here, the “requesting party” is the ICC itself, an international court, so the judicial proceedings for extradition simply do not apply.

Even if the ICC were to ask the Philippine government for cooperation, it would not be a treaty-based extradition request but an enforcement of a warrant duly issued by an international tribunal that binds the Philippines under International Law.

As such, there is simply no legal basis to treat the ICC as a “requesting state” under the Rules on Extradition. Instead, any cooperation with the ICC must rely on other legal mechanisms.

Republic Act. No. 9851 as the governing domestic legal framework

Notably, Republic Act No. 9851[7] provides a pathway for surrender to international tribunals.

Section 17 of R.A. 9851 recognizes that Philippine authorities may opt not to prosecute a suspect domestically if another court or international tribunal is already investigating or prosecuting the crime, viz:

In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense with the investigation or prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international court, if any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties.[8]

In other words, Philippine law itself anticipates the scenario of an international tribunal’s involvement: it permits handing over an accused to an international court like the ICC, bypassing the extradition process that is required for requests from states.

This is a crucial distinction because R.A. 9851 used the term “or” in separating surrender and extradite in its Section 17, highlighting their difference. Clearly, the law allows cooperation with the ICC through executive action, reflecting the understanding that certain crimes of international concern are better addressed in international fora. The legal hurdle, therefore, is not a lack of domestic authority to surrender, but rather a question of political will.

In the case of the supposed International Warrant issued against Senator Bato dela Rosa, the Executive Branch has the option, as it has courageously and rightly done so in the case of Rodrigo Duterte, to surrender him to the ICC with R.A. 9851 as the legal basis; what remains to be seen is whether it will choose to do so.

Rome Statute Obligations Continue to Govern Acts Committed During the Philippines’ Period of Membership

Another critical legal point is that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,[9] which the Philippines ratified in 2011 and was in force domestically until the withdrawal took effect on March 17, 2019, continues to govern accountability for acts committed during the period of Philippine membership.

The ICC’s investigation into the so-called “War on Drugs” of former President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, who is presently under custody at the ICC in The Hague, Netherlands, covers the years 2016-2019, when the Philippines was still an ICC State Party.

The Rome Statute itself, in Article 127(2), explicitly provides:

A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective.[10]

Consistent with this, the Supreme Court in Pangilinan v. Cayetano,[11] in a 15-0 unanimous decision, affirmed that the ICC retains authority over crimes committed up to the date of withdrawal and that the Philippines remains duty-bound to cooperate in proceedings regarding those events. The Supreme Court en banc stated unequivocally:

Mechanisms that safeguard human rights and protect against the grave offenses sought to be addressed by the Rome Statute remain formally in place in this jurisdiction. Further, the International Criminal Court retains jurisdiction over any and all acts committed by government actors until March 17, 2019. Hence, withdrawal from the Rome Statute does not affect the liabilities of individuals charged before the International Criminal Court for acts committed up to this date.[12]

In short, escaping the ICC’s reach is not as simple as pulling out of the treaty. Any alleged crimes committed while the Philippines was an ICC member, such as those during Senator dela Rosa’s tenure as national police chief, remain within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Thus, Senator Bato cannot hide behind the fact that the Philippines is no longer an ICC member.

The jurisdiction of the ICC is legally established: it can prosecute crimes that occurred while the Rome Statute was in effect for the Philippines, and any domestic law enforcement or judicial bodies are legally expected to cooperate in such prosecutions. This has been affirmed by the recent decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber dated October 23, 2025[13] affirming the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crimes against humanity that were committed in the Philippines while the latter was still a member, viz:

For all of the above reasons, as a result of the Prosecution’s preliminary examination having commenced prior to both the Philippines depositing its written notification of withdrawal from the Statute and the date on which that withdrawal became effective, the Chamber finds that the Court can exercise its jurisdiction in the present case over the crimes alleged against Mr. Duterte that were committed on the territory of the Philippines while it was a State Party. The jurisdictional regime set out in Part 2 of the Statute continues to apply to this case as if the Philippines were still a Party to the Statute, so as to ensure that, pursuant to article 127(2) of the Statute, the withdrawal of the Philippines from the Statute “shall not […] prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective”. [14]

In plain terms, obligations incurred and investigations started before March 2019 survive the withdrawal. The ICC’s supposed warrant for Dela Rosa rests on this solid legal foundation that the alleged acts (extrajudicial killings and other crimes against humanity) occurred when the Philippines had an international commitment to punish and prevent such atrocities, a commitment that the ICC can still enforce despite our withdrawal.

Conclusion

The Extradition Rules should be set aside here not out of disrespect, but because they simply do not cover an ICC warrant of arrest. The Rome Statute remains applicable to past acts and continues to bind the Philippines, and the country, as a responsible member of the Community of Nations, must assist the ICC in bringing perpetrators to justice.

Far from violating its sovereignty, honoring these commitments upholds the rule of law and the Philippines’ reputation as a nation that does not shy away from accountability for grave abuses. If domestic remedies have truly failed or been obstructed, the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction is not a threat but a remedy of last resort: one that exists because the world, including the Philippines, has long agreed that certain crimes must not go unpunished.

In case our own courts insist on blocking the enforcement of the supposed ICC warrant for Bato Dela Rosa, it will not only make the Philippines lose its credibility in calling for the respect for International Law in the West Philippine Sea but such an act will also affirm the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction—it will only show that this country is unwilling and unable to domestically prosecute these atrocious crimes. 

It must be recalled that our country once took pride in joining the ICC, heralding the Filipino People’s dedication to human rights and the fight against impunity.

Withdrawal from the Rome Statute may have been a step back, but it cannot erase crimes nor the demands of justice. The law, both domestic and international, still arms the Philippines with tools to do what is right. The ICC’s supposed warrant for Senator Bato is a test of our legal system’s integrity and our leaders’ commitment to the values we supposedly profess as a people.

Will this country invoke technicalities to shield perpetrators, or will it heed the call of justice beyond borders?

The ICC’s hand remains extended and it is up to the Philippine government whether to clasp it and cooperate, or to remain an outlier in the shared global effort to hold accountable those accused of the worst crimes known to humankind.

[1] ICC arrest warrant vs Bato out — Ombudsman Remulla. PHILSTAR. November 8, 2025, available at https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2025/11/08/2485716/icc-arrest-warrant-vs-bato-out-ombudsman-remulla (last accessed on November 9, 2025).

[2] SC Administrative Matter No. 22-03-29-SC, April 8, 2025, Rules on Extradition Proceedings. Henceforth, “Rules on Extradition.”

[3] SC Approves Rules on Extradition Proceedings, October 27, 2025, available at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-approves-rules-on-extradition-proceedings/ (last accessed on November 9, 2025)

[4] Section 3 (m), Rules on Extradition.

[5] Section 3 (g), Rules on Extradition.

[6] Section 3 (e), Rules on Extradition.

[7] Republic Act No. 9851 (2009), Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity.

[8] Republic Act No. 9851, Section 17.

[9] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), July 1, 2002, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf (last accessed on November 9, 2025)

[10] Rome Statute, Article 127(2).

[11] Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]

[12] Id. Emphasis ours.

[13] IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, ICC-01/21-01/25, 23 October 2025, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd180cd6044.pdf (last accessed on November 10, 2025)

[14] Id. Emphasis ours.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the Firm or any of its partners. This article shall not be construed as official legal advice from the Firm.  

Atty. Dino S. de Leon is an experienced lawyer and advocate. He was formerly affiliated with a leading firm in the Philippines prior to joining Dargon Law. He has extensive experience in, among others, litigation and dispute resolution, arbitration, infrastructure law and Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), labor, financial rehabilitation and corporate liquidation, insolvency, project finance, mergers and acquisitions, start ups, and franchising. He previously worked with the Philippine Department of Finance Privatization Group and served as a legal director of a PPP consulting firm. He received his Bachelor of Arts Major in Development Studies in 2009 and Juris Doctor Degree in 2014, both from De La Salle University. He completed his Master of Laws (with distinction) at Georgetown University and obtained certificates in both Public and Private International Law at The Hague Academy of International Law. In 2024, he obtained a certificate from the Asian Institute of Management for the Chief Financial Officer Program. He was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 2015.

Atty. Lance Vladimir M. Molino is a lawyer who earned his Bachelor of Arts in Legal Management from the University of the East (summa cum laude), and his Juris Doctor from San Beda College Alabang. He spent five years as a paralegal in the City Legal Office of Pasay.

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